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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Daryle McNelis appeals the District Court’s summary 
judgment in favor of his former employer, PPL Susquehanna, 
LLC.1 McNelis worked at PPL’s nuclear power plant as an 
armed security officer from 2009 until he was fired in 2012 
after failing a fitness for duty examination. McNelis sued, 
                                                 
1 After this case was filed, McNelis’s former employer, 
misidentified in the caption as Pennsylvania Power & Light 
Company, was renamed Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC. 
3 
 
claiming his termination violated the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. The District Court disagreed, holding that 
McNelis was fired because he lacked a legally mandated job 
requirement, namely, the unrestricted security access 
authorization that the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission requires of all armed security guards. For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  
I 
 This appeal requires us to analyze the relationship 
between the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the 
regulations promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC). We begin with the governing regulations 
and then turn to the facts of the case.  
A 
As the operator of a nuclear power reactor, PPL was 
required to comply with regulations issued by the NRC, two of 
which are seminal to this appeal. 
First, PPL was required to implement a “fitness for duty 
program” to ensure that “individuals are not under the 
influence of any substance, legal or illegal, or mentally or 
physically impaired from any cause, which in any way 
adversely affects their ability to safely and competently 
perform their duties.” 10 C.F.R. § 26.23(b). If an employee’s 
fitness is “questionable,” the employer “shall take immediate 
action to prevent the individual from” continuing to perform 
his duties. 10 C.F.R. § 26.77(b). 
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 PPL also was required to maintain an “access 
authorization program” to monitor employees who had access 
to sensitive areas of the plant. 10 C.F.R. § 73.56(a)–(b). Under 
this program, nuclear power plants must “provide high 
assurance” that employees “are trustworthy and reliable, such 
that they do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health 
and safety or the common defense and security.” 10 C.F.R. 
§ 73.56(c). Before an employee is granted unrestricted access, 
he must undergo a psychological assessment that evaluates 
“the possible adverse impact of any noted psychological 
characteristics on the individual’s trustworthiness and 
reliability.” 10 C.F.R. § 73.56(e). Once granted, unrestricted 
access is subject to constant monitoring. Nuclear power plants 
must institute a “behavioral observation program” to identify 
aberrant behaviors. 10 C.F.R. § 73.56(f). All employees are 
required to report suspicious behaviors, and any report triggers 
a reassessment of that employee’s access. 10 C.F.R. 
§ 73.56(f)(3). If during the reassessment an official believes 
the employee’s “trustworthiness or reliability is questionable,” 
the official must terminate the employee’s unrestricted access 
during the review period. Id. 
B 
 PPL hired Daryle McNelis as a Nuclear Security Officer 
in 2009. In that role, McNelis had unrestricted access to PPL’s 
plant and was responsible for, among other things, protecting 
its vital areas and preventing radiological sabotage. McNelis 
carried a firearm (often an AR-15) and was authorized to use 
deadly force.  
In April 2012, McNelis experienced personal and 
mental health problems. McNelis was paranoid about 
surveillance. He believed that various items in his home (such 
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as his children’s toy cars) were covert listening devices and he 
told his wife he would kill whoever was following him. 
McNelis also had problems with alcohol and his “use of 
alcohol [was] an issue of contention with his wife.” App. 32. 
Finally, a close friend and co-worker of McNelis named Kris 
Keefer believed McNelis had become obsessed with bath 
salts—a synthetic drug that affects the central nervous system. 
McNelis had admitted to using bath salts in the past and co-
workers suspected he was doing so again.  
In the midst of these troubles, McNelis’s wife moved 
herself and the children out of the family home. That same day, 
local police received an anonymous 911 call warning that 
McNelis may “come to the schools to get his children” and 
“may be under the influence and possibly armed.” App. 19. 
The school district was locked down for two hours—but the 
police eventually determined that McNelis never intended to 
go to the schools.  
Two days later, McNelis agreed to meet his wife at a 
psychiatric facility for treatment. The treating physician’s 
initial evaluation noted that McNelis suffered from “paranoid 
thoughts, . . . sleeplessness, [and] questionable auditory 
hallucinations.” App. 26–27. After a three day stay in the 
inpatient unit, McNelis was discharged with instructions to 
“[d]iscontinue or reduce the use of alcohol.” App. 28.  
 During the events of April 2012, McNelis’s friend and 
co-worker Keefer became concerned by McNelis’s behavior. 
As required by NRC regulations and PPL policy, Keefer 
reported his concerns to a supervisor, explaining that McNelis 
was “emotionally erratic[,] . . . not sleeping well and having 
illusions” about surveillance. App. 20. Keefer also opined that 
McNelis’s behavior warranted “immediate attention.” Id. 
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Pursuant to NRC regulations, McNelis’s unrestricted access 
was “placed on hold” pending medical clearance. App. 29.  
McNelis then met with Dr. David Thompson—a third-
party psychologist who performs fitness for duty examinations 
at approximately 20 nuclear facilities nationwide, including 
PPL’s plant. Dr. Thompson interviewed McNelis and 
performed testing required by PPL policy and NRC 
regulations. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 26.187, 73.56(e)(6). He then 
issued two reports, the second of which—a Substance Abuse 
Expert Determination of Fitness report—stated that “McNelis 
is considered not fit for duty pending receipt and review of a 
report from the facility where he receives an alcohol 
assessment and possibly treatment.” App. 35.   
Upon learning that McNelis had been deemed not fit for 
duty by Dr. Thompson, PPL revoked McNelis’s unescorted 
access authorization and terminated his employment. After his 
internal appeal was denied, McNelis filed this suit. The District 
Court granted PPL summary judgment and McNelis timely 
appealed.  
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We exercise plenary review over McNelis’s challenge 
to the District Court’s summary judgment. Blunt v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). McNelis 
sued under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, all of which are 
“interpreted consistently” and share “the same standard for 
determination of liability.” Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 
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675 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2012). For the sake of brevity, we 
will analyze the statutes together and reference only the ADA.  
III 
McNelis claims his termination violated the ADA 
because “he was erroneously regarded as having a disability in 
the form of alcoholism, mental illness and/or illegal drug use, 
and that this misperception was a motivating factor in his 
firing.” McNelis Br. 26. To establish a prima facie case under 
the ADA, McNelis had to establish that he “(1) has a 
‘disability,’ (2) is a ‘qualified individual,’ and (3) has suffered 
an adverse employment action because of that disability.” 
Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 
2006). The parties contend, and we agree, that this case turns 
on the second prong: whether McNelis is a “qualified 
individual.” 
“A two-part test is used to determine whether someone 
is a qualified individual with a disability.” Gaul v. Lucent 
Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation 
omitted). First, the individual must satisfy “the prerequisites 
for the position, such as possessing the appropriate educational 
background, employment experience, skills, licenses, etc.” 29 
C.F.R. Pt. 1630 (Appendix). Second, the individual must be 
able to “perform the essential functions of the position held or 
desired, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Id.  
Whether or not McNelis could satisfy the first part of 
the analysis, we agree with PPL that McNelis could not 
perform the “essential functions” of his job. NRC regulations 
require Nuclear Security Officers to be fit for duty, 10 C.F.R. 
§ 26.4(a), and to maintain unescorted security clearance, 10 
C.F.R. § 73.56(b)(1). Because McNelis did not satisfy either 
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legally mandated requirement at the time he was fired, his 
claim failed as a matter of law.  
Although we are the first court of appeals to address the 
interplay between the ADA and these NRC regulations, our 
opinion is supported by a broad consensus among district 
courts that nuclear power plant employees who have lost 
security clearance or have been deemed not fit for duty are not 
qualified employees under the ADA. See Stevens v. S. Nuclear 
Operating Co., 2016 WL 4535662, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 30, 
2016) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff was determined not fit to return to 
work during the relevant time periods, she could not perform 
the essential functions of the job.”); Lute v. Dominion Nuclear 
Conn., Inc., 2015 WL 1456769, at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2015) 
(“The Court finds that having [unrestricted access 
authorization] was essential to [the plaintiff’s] job as a Plant 
Equipment Operator in a nuclear power facility, and without it, 
he was not ‘otherwise qualified to perform the essential 
functions of his job . . . .’”); Wetherbee v. S. Nuclear Operating 
Co., 2010 WL 11428172, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2010) 
(“[A]n essential job function of the [plaintiff’s position at the 
NRC-regulated plant] is that the employee filling that position 
be determined to be fit for duty as required by the NRC . . . .”); 
Sysko v. PPL Corp., 2009 WL 4725240, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 
2, 2009) (“[A]n employee who is unable to maintain 
unescorted access status is not qualified to perform the 
essential functions of a position within the [NRC-regulated] 
nuclear facility.”); Mathieson v. Am. Elec. Power, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6560, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2002) (“An 
employee’s inability to satisfy [the NRC’s] legally dictated 
fitness-for-duty program is ‘by its very nature an essential 
function.’” (citation omitted)); McCoy v. Pa. Power and Light 
Co., 933 F. Supp. 438, 444 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (“[I]t is apparent 
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as a matter of law that plaintiff is not a qualified individual with 
a disability within the meaning of the ADA, since his disability 
precludes him from retaining the security clearance necessary 
to perform his former job.”). These decisions are based on the 
well-settled proposition that “a legally-defined job 
qualification is by its very nature an essential function under 
[the ADA].” Brickers v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 145 F.3d 846, 
850 (6th Cir. 1998). 
We also find support in the opinions of our sister courts 
of appeals that have applied the same rationale in cases raising 
analogous ADA claims that implicate Department of 
Transportation (DOT) regulations. For example, in Hawkins v. 
Schwan’s Home Service, Inc., the Tenth Circuit rejected an 
ADA claim brought by an employee who was fired for failing 
a DOT-mandated medical examination. 778 F.3d 877, 895 
(10th Cir. 2015). The court reasoned that the employer’s 
insistence on DOT certification “stems directly from the 
federal motor-safety regulations, which preclude a person from 
‘driving a commercial motor vehicle unless he/she is . . . 
medically certified as physically qualified to do so.’” Id. 
(alterations and citations omitted). The court held that “being 
DOT-certified is an automatic, binding, and utterly 
unavoidable requirement”—and was thus an “essential 
function” of the employee’s job. Id.; see also Williams v. J.B. 
Hunt Transp., Inc., 826 F.3d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding 
that the plaintiff “failed to establish that he was qualified for 
the job in question . . . [b]ecause he lacked the DOT 
certification required by federal law”); Harris v. P.A.M. 
Transp., Inc., 339 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming 
dismissal of an ADA claim where the employer “was applying 
the [DOT regulations] to which it was bound”); Bay v. Cassens 
Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Under 
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applicable DOT regulations, [the employer] was not allowed 
to permit [the plaintiff] to resume driving until he produced a 
copy of a doctor’s certificate indicating he was physically 
qualified to drive, and nothing in the ADA purports to change 
that obligation.” (citations omitted)).  
Finally, our holding is in accord with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 
555 (1999). In that case, the plaintiff was fired from his job as 
a truck driver after his incurable eye disorder prevented him 
from meeting DOT vision standards. Id. at 559. In ruling on the 
plaintiff’s ADA claim, the Court explained that the employer 
has an “unconditional obligation to follow the [DOT] 
regulations and [a] consequent right to do so,” and therefore 
could fire the plaintiff due to his vision issues. Id. at 570. The 
Court found “crucial” to its holding the fact that Albertson’s 
“was not insisting upon a job qualification merely of its own 
devising,” but was complying with a regulation that was 
concededly valid and “ha[d] the force of law.” Id. It deemed its 
holding consistent with the structure of the ADA because, 
“[w]hen Congress enacted the ADA, it recognized that federal 
safety rules would limit application of the ADA as a matter of 
law.” Id. at 573.2 
                                                 
2 Albertson’s reveals another fatal flaw in McNelis’s 
cause of action. Even assuming for the sake of argument that 
McNelis could demonstrate a prima facie case, compliance 
with federal law provides PPL with a defense to McNelis’s 
suit. As the Supreme Court recognized, an employer has a right 
to “insist on” compliance with legally mandated job 
requirements. Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 571. And the 
implementing regulations of the ADA provide that it is a 
defense to a claim of discrimination “that a challenged action 
11 
 
McNelis makes several counterarguments, none of 
which we find persuasive. First, he notes that a judgment in 
favor of PPL would diminish “the protections of the ADA for 
workers in sensitive positions within the nuclear industry.” 
McNelis Br. 29. Contrary to McNelis’s characterization, this is 
a feature—not a bug—of the nuclear regulatory scheme. 
Presumably because of the sensitive nature of the work, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission made a policy judgment that 
for a limited number of jobs, nuclear power plants must screen 
employees for certain traits and behaviors that may endanger 
the public. See 10 C.F.R. § 26.23; 10 C.F.R. § 73.56(c); see 
generally Rushton v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 565 
n.5 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that nuclear power plant employees 
have diminished workplace rights because “the danger of 
catastrophic loss of health and life is so great”). The NRC 
regulations do not exempt individuals with disabilities, and 
indeed, it would be strangely ineffective for them to do so; the 
fact that a certain trait or behavior coincides with a recognized 
disability does not make it any less dangerous to the public. To 
the contrary, NRC regulations explicitly require nuclear power 
plants to screen for traits and behaviors in a manner that in 
                                                 
is required or necessitated by another Federal law or 
regulation, or that another Federal law or regulation prohibits 
an action . . . that would otherwise be required.” 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.15(e); see also Bay, 212 F.3d at 975 (“[The employer] 
may assert [the employee’s] lack of [DOT] certification as a 
valid defense to [his] ADA claim.”). To rule otherwise “would 
force a Hobson’s choice” on PPL, leaving it to pick between 
ADA liability on the one hand and administrative penalties on 
the other. Brickers, 145 F.3d at 850.  
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other contexts may violate the ADA.3 And the premise that the 
ADA applies differently to professions that implicate the 
public welfare is as essential as it is unremarkable. See, e.g., 
Watson v. City of Miami Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 935 (11th Cir. 
1999) (“Police departments place armed officers in positions 
where they can do tremendous harm if they act irrationally. 
Contrary to [the plaintiff’s] contention, the ADA does not, 
indeed cannot, require a police department to forgo a fitness 
for duty examination . . . .”). 
Next, McNelis claims he should have been afforded “an 
opportunity to address the erroneous perception of Dr. 
Thompson and PPL.” Reply Br. 14. In fact, McNelis was given 
that chance through the review procedures outlined in the NRC 
regulations. See 10 C.F.R. § 73.56(l); 10 C.F.R. § 26.39. 
McNelis received through the administrative process an 
“impartial and independent internal management review” and 
was given “an opportunity to provide additional relevant 
information and an opportunity for an objective review of the 
information upon which the [decision] was based.” 10 C.F.R. 
§ 73.56(l). Thus, McNelis’s claim that he had “no way to 
legally challenge [PPL’s] erroneous perception,” McNelis Br. 
at 33, is incorrect. 
                                                 
3 Compare 10 C.F.R. § 73.56(e) (requiring nuclear 
employees to pass a psychological assessment that screens for 
“any noted psychological characteristics on the individual’s 
trustworthiness and reliability”), with Olson v. Gen. Elec. 
Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 953 n.5 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that 
the ADA generally prohibits discrimination based on “[a]ny 
mental or psychological disorder, such as . . . emotional or 
mental illness”). 
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To the extent McNelis argues he was entitled to more 
process than that delineated by the NRC regulations, he is 
again mistaken. While PPL had an “unconditional obligation 
to follow the regulations,” it also had a “consequent right to do 
so.” Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 570 (emphasis added). Although 
McNelis contends that PPL acted too “precipitously” in 
revoking his access authorization or should have provided him 
an opportunity to more “fully engage” in the review process, 
Reply Br. at 13, PPL was permitted to follow the NRC 
regulations that provided otherwise.  
McNelis does not seriously dispute that PPL followed 
the procedures outlined in the NRC regulations,4 but argues 
that his termination was discriminatory because PPL typically 
does not fire employees before giving them a chance to regain 
access. But “the fact that certain accommodations may have 
been offered . . . to some employees as a matter of good faith 
                                                 
4 In his reply brief, McNelis argues in passing that PPL 
did not inform him of the reason he lost unrestricted access, as 
required by 10 C.F.R. § 73.56(l) (“[T]he individual [must be] 
informed of the grounds for the denial or unfavorable 
termination” of “access authorization.”). As support for this 
argument, McNelis notes that his employment termination 
letter “told [him] absolutely nothing with regard to the reason 
PPL fired him.” Reply Br. at 9 (emphasis omitted). McNelis 
confuses termination of employment with termination of 
access. Here, the regulations require the employee to have the 
access termination explained, which PPL did as part of 
McNelis’s review request. See App. 559 (“Reason for 
Denial/Revocation of Unescorted Access Authorization: SAE 
Evaluation,” “Basis for Decision: Not Fit for Duty . . . Requires 
an Alcohol Assessment and Treatment Certification”). 
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does not mean that they must be extended to [each employee] 
as a matter of law.” Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 
1995). This is true even though PPL policy generally allows 
individuals to comply with treatment recommendations before 
termination. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 138 F.3d 1304, 
1310 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Absent proof of discrimination as 
defined by the ADA, an employer’s failure to follow its own 
internal policies does not in itself constitute a violation of the 
ADA.”), rev’d on other grounds, 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 
1999) (en banc).  
Finally, McNelis asserts that a jury could have deemed 
Dr. Thompson’s fitness determination erroneous. In essence, 
McNelis claims PPL was not entitled to rely on Dr. 
Thompson’s determination that he was not fit for duty in light 
of other evidence he submitted from his personal doctors. We 
disagree. The Supreme Court has indicated that in the ADA 
context, a court should not “second-guess” a physician’s 
determination that an employee failed to meet the regulatory 
requirements of his job. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
527 U.S. 516, 522 (1999). This is doubly true in the 
circumstances of this case, because NRC regulations 
prohibited PPL from questioning the determination of fitness 
after it was made by Dr. Thompson. 10 C.F.R. § 26.189(d) 
(“Neither the individual nor licensees . . . may seek a second 
determination of fitness if a determination of fitness . . . has 
already been performed by a qualified professional . . . .”).5 
                                                 
5 Because the District Court did not err when it held that 
McNelis did not meet his burden of establishing a prima facie 
case of discrimination, we need not consider the various issues 
related to whether his firing was pretextual. See Williams v. 
Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 
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* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
                                                 
2004). However, we note the incoherence of McNelis’s theory 
that PPL used McNelis’s fitness for duty concerns to mask that 
it was firing him because it thought he used bath salts and had 
psychological issues. Either of these allegedly forbidden 
reasons for his termination would have been additional valid 
reasons for PPL to have revoked McNelis’s plant access. See 
10 C.F.R. § 26.23(b) (requiring PPL to ensure that McNelis 
was not “mentally or physically impaired from any cause, 
which in any way adversely affects [his] ability to safely and 
competently perform [his] duties”). Thus, while McNelis may 
point to disparate treatment on account of his perceived 
disability, he cannot show that the disparate treatment 
amounted to discrimination. See Doe v. Cty. of Centre, PA, 242 
F.3d 437, 447 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ADA allows disparate 
treatment in certain cases. . . . [and] recognizes that the goal of 
ending disability discrimination must be balanced against the 
health and safety risks that disabilities sometimes pose to 
others.”). 
